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INTRODUCTION
Online hacking from China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other
parts of the world has caught the attention of U.S. policymakers,
commentators, and the American public. For example, the discussion of
the systematic attacks launched by potentially government-sponsored
Chinese hackers reinforces the view that China is using all means
necessary to compete against the United States.1 After years of
cyberattacks linked to Unit 61398 of the People’s Liberation Army,
which is also known as the “Comment Crew” or the “Shanghai Group,”
the U.S. Department of Justice finally issued a symbolic indictment of
† Copyright © 2015 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and
Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School. An earlier version of
this Article was presented at the “Protecting Trade Secrets in Asia and the United States”
Conference at John Marshall Law School in Chicago. The Author is grateful to Doris Long for
her hospitality, and Derek Bambauer and the conference participants for their valuable comments
and suggestions.
1 For discussions of China’s cyberthreat, see generally CHINA AND CYBERSECURITY:
ESPIONAGE, STRATEGY, AND POLITICS IN THE DIGITAL DOMAIN (Jon R. Lindsay et al., 2015)
[hereinafter CHINA AND CYBERSECURITY]; DENNIS F. POINDEXTER, THE CHINESE INFORMATION
WAR: ESPIONAGE, CYBERWAR, COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL AND RELATED THREATS TO
UNITED STATES INTERESTS (2013); CARL ROPER, TRADE SECRET THEFT, INDUSTRIAL
ESPIONAGE, AND THE CHINA THREAT (2014).
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its five group members.2 Research published by the Information
Warfare Monitor, including a rather disturbing report on GhostNet, also
traced cyberespionage and other intrusive activities back to computers
located in China.3
Most recently, the unprecedented cyberattack on Sony’s movie
studio—allegedly from North Korea4—delayed and scaled back the
nationwide theatrical release of the film The Interview.5 The intrusion
not only embarrassed studio executives and Hollywood in general, but
also raised cybersecurity concerns among the U.S. business
community.6 In the wake of this attack, President Barack Obama called
for greater cooperation between the government and the private sector
to protect cybersecurity and the country’s critical infrastructure,7 which
includes “oil pipelines, railroad tracks, water treatment facilities and the
power grid.”8 He also issued an executive order to promote the
voluntary “sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks and
incidents.”9
Taking advantage of the forum provided by this timely
Symposium, this Article closely examines the ongoing debate on
China’s sustained effort in using online hacking and other intrusive
techniques to steal trade secrets and proprietary data from U.S.
2 See Michael S. Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of
Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A1 (reporting the indictment).
3 INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, TRACKING GHOSTNET: INVESTIGATING A CYBER ESPIONAGE
NETWORK (2009); INFO. WARFARE MONITOR & SHADOWSERVER FOUND., SHADOWS IN THE
CLOUD: INVESTIGATING CYBER ESPIONAGE 2.0 (2010); see also Sarah McKune, “Foreign
Hostile Forces”: The Human Rights Dimension of China’s Cyber Campaigns, in CHINA AND
CYBERSECURITY, supra note 1, at 260, 274 (“While these investigations did not generate
conclusive evidence of Chinese government backing, the interest and/or involvement of the
Chinese state is probable in light of the targeted entities and technical forensics indicating China
as the location of the command-and-control servers employed.”).
4 But see Nicole Perlroth, Experts Question U.S. Account of Sony Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2014, at B4 (stating that “private security researchers are increasingly voicing doubts that the
hack of Sony’s computer systems was the work of North Korea”).
5 See David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, U.S. Is Said to Find North Korea Behind
Cyberattack on Sony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at A1 (reporting that “the four largest theater
chains in the United States—Regal Entertainment, AMC Entertainment, Cinemark and Carmike
Cinemas—and several smaller chains said they would not show ‘The Interview’ as a result of the
[terrorist] threat”).
6 See Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony Attack Is Unraveling Relationships in
Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2014, at B1 (reporting that “[t]he attack has disrupted the web
of executive, business and talent relationships that stitches together Sony’s core moviemaking
operation”); Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Sony’s Dirty Laundry, for All to See, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2014, at B1 (reporting the disclosure of executive salaries, unpublished scripts, sensitive
contracts, aliases used by stars to check into hotels, and a highly embarrassing email exchange
between Sony’s co-chairwoman and a film producer).
7 Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Obama Calls for New Cooperation to Wrangle the
“Wild West” Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2015, at B1.
8 Nicole Perlroth, Hacked vs. Hackers: Game On, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at F1.
9 Exec. Order No. 13,691 (Feb. 13, 2015), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-informationshari.
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businesses. Part I outlines the five common narratives that have thus far
been advanced to recount this widely criticized effort. Sensing the
narratives’ negative overtones, Part II offers five modest suggestions on
how a more positive debate can be constructed to help identify ways to
reduce online hacking and data breaches as well as to enhance the
protection of trade secrets and proprietary data.
I.

FIVE COMMON NARRATIVES

From ancient Egyptians to the Warring States in China, espionage
and intelligence activities have been undertaken for millennia to collect
information and to steal military secrets.10 While these activities
received wide news coverage during the Cold War era, many of them
have now migrated to the digital environment, the Internet in particular.
Owing to “its logistical advantages and the promise of plausible
deniability,” the online environment is especially attractive.11 Indeed,
the recent proliferation of online hacking and data breaches from abroad
have led policymakers and commentators to discuss these activities in
connection with cyberwarfare, information warfare, or what Eric
Schmidt and Jared Cohen recently popularized as the “New Code
War.”12
Nevertheless, what China has been accused of seems to be quite
different from what the Soviet Union used to do during the Cold War
era. Instead of stealing state and military secrets, Chinese hackers are
now also targeting business, technical, scientific, and industrial
information.13 It is therefore understandable why Chinese hacking
activities have become a major concern for U.S. policymakers and
businesses alike.
To the Obama administration, for example, “there is a major
10 See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 230 (2010) (“Nations have been engaging in
espionage at least since biblical times.”); Nigel Inkster, The Chinese Intelligence Agencies:
Evolution and Empowerment in Cyberspace, in CHINA AND CYBERSECURITY, supra note 1, at 29,
29 (“The concept of intelligence is . . . well entrenched in Chinese culture dating back to the time
of the warring states (c. 475–221 B.C.), when Sunzi’s Art of War (Sunzi bingfa), which deals at
length with the subject of espionage, appeared.”).
11 WILLIAM C. HANNAS ET AL., CHINESE INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE: TECHNOLOGY
ACQUISITION AND MILITARY MODERNISATION 218 (2013); see also INFO. WARFARE MONITOR,
supra note 3, at 12 (“[T]he challenge of identifying perpetrators and understanding their motives
gives state actors convenient plausible deniability and the ability to officially distance themselves
from attacks.”); ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE
FUTURE OF PEOPLE, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 104 (2013) (“A cyber attack might be the state’s
perfect weapon: powerful, customizable and anonymous.”).
12 SCHMIDT & COHEN, supra note 11, at 112.
13 See ROPER, supra note 1, at xiii (“When the USSR was still in existence, information
collected was more of military and political in nature. Since its demise, more theft has occurred,
with China being the culprit this time—in both volume and specificity—and it is not just military
or political, but runs the entire gamut of just about every area you could think of.”).
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difference between spying for national security purposes, something the
United States does daily, and the commercial, for-profit espionage
carried out by China’s military.”14 As reported in The New York Times:
[W]hen Mr. Obama raised the issue [about online hacking] with Xi
Jinping, the Chinese president, he focused only on commercial
espionage, arguing it is far more pernicious to use the intelligence
instruments of the state for a business advantage. The United States
may do all it can to learn about China’s nuclear arsenal, or Beijing’s
intentions in its territorial disputes with Japan, but it does not, he
says, steal from China Telecom to help AT&T.15

The line the U.S. administration draws between fair play and foul
play, however, is not as clear as one would expect. Not only do most
countries—democratic or otherwise—fail to recognize it,16 this line is
also not always drawn in situations involving U.S. intelligence and
surveillance efforts. As The New York Times continued in its report:
[T]he United States spies regularly for economic advantage when the
goal is to support trade talks; when the Clinton administration was
locked in a high-stakes negotiation in the 1990s to reach an accord
with Japan, it bugged the Japanese negotiator’s limousine. At the
time, the chief beneficiaries would have been the Big Three auto
companies and a smattering of parts suppliers. It is also widely
believed to be using intelligence in support of trade negotiations
underway with European and Asian trading partners.17

In addition, a top secret document obtained by Edward Snowden, a
former National Security Agency contractor, showed that “an American
law firm [had been] monitored while representing a foreign government
in trade disputes with the United States,” the lawyers’ attorney-client
privilege notwithstanding.18 If the U.S. administration considered it a
matter of national security to spy on a local law firm defending a
foreign government in a trade dispute, it is not difficult to understand
why other countries have had a tough time drawing the line between
commercial espionage and national security. This difficulty is
particularly acute in a country such as China, given the perceived
14 David E. Sanger, With Spy Charges, U.S. Draws a Line That Few Others Recognize, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2014, at A8.
15 Id.
16 See id. (“[W]hile American officials are loath to admit it, Washington’s view has relatively
few advocates around the world. The French, for example, were notorious for conducting statebacked corporate espionage long before the Chinese mastered the form.”); Jon R. Lindsay,
Introduction: China and Cybersecurity: Controversy and Context, in CHINA AND
CYBERSECURITY, supra note 1, at 1, 13 (“American attempts to articulate the difference between
the political-military targets of US cyber espionage and the economic targets of Chinese
espionage, or between Internet control as practiced by China and metadata collection as practiced
by the [National Security Agency], have tended to fall on deaf ears.”).
17 Sanger, supra note 14.
18 James Risen & Laura Poitras, Spying by N.S.A. Ally Entangled U.S. Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2014, at A1.
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“overlap between security and economic concerns” among Chinese
policymakers19 and the continued domination of state-owned enterprises
in the local business environment. It is also worth recalling that the
Obama administration has repeatedly invoked national security to
justify the nondisclosure of the negotiating texts of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement.20
Thus far, five common narratives have emerged concerning the
online hacking and data breaches conducted by Chinese hackers. This
Article will examine each narrative in turn.
A.

U.S. Businesses

The first narrative focuses on the interests and frustrations of U.S.
businesses. The lack of protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights in China has been the subject of a perennial debate about
China.21 Although the country’s accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), repeated amendments of intellectual property
laws and regulations, and increased provision of enforcement resources
have greatly strengthened the protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights, the protection of trade secrets and proprietary data
remains inadequate—and, from the standpoint of U.S. rights holders,
woefully inadequate.
In March 2014, for instance, a former DuPont employee and his
accomplice were found guilty of selling to a Chinese company
DuPont’s trade secret concerning the use of titanium dioxide to whiten
products.22 This conviction joined a long line of convictions and arrests
19 Adam Segal, Chinese Economic Statecraft and the Political Economy of Asian Security, in
CHINA’S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA 146, 147 (William W. Keller &
Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007); see also Schmidt & Sanger, supra note 2 (noting that “the
Chinese, with their vast state-owned enterprises, many run by the People’s Liberation Army, have
often argued that economic security and national security are one”).
20 For discussions of a lack of transparency in the negotiations surrounding these agreements,
see generally David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation
of International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105 (2012); Peter K.
Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 998–1019 (2011).
21 For the Author’s earlier discussions on piracy and counterfeiting in China, see generally
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007) [hereinafter Yu,
China Puzzle]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China
in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to
Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
901 (2006); Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV.
INT’L L. 209 (2011).
22 Karen Gullo, California Man Guilty of Stealing DuPont Trade Secrets,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Mar. 5, 2014, 5:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0305/california-man-guilty-of-stealing-dupont-trade-secrets.html.
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generated from Chinese industrial espionage activities.23 Following the
DuPont case and other similar complaints, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) raised the priority of trade secret protection in
the China enforcement agenda. As he stated in the 2014 Special 301
Report:
[T]rade secret theft is a serious and growing problem in China.
Thefts may arise in a variety of circumstances, including those
involving departing employees, failed joint ventures, and cyber
intrusion and hacking. In addition, thefts arising from the misuse of
information submitted to government entities for purposes of
complying with regulatory obligations are particularly troubling. The
misappropriation of trade secrets and their use by a competing
enterprise can have a devastating impact on a company’s business,
making recourse to adequate and effective legal remedies particularly
important.24

According to this report, cyberintrusion and online hacking have been
repeatedly used to steal trade secrets and proprietary data from U.S.
businesses. Also of concern are the “thefts arising from the misuse of
information submitted to government entities for purposes of complying
with regulatory obligations.”25 Such information includes the
undisclosed clinical trial data submitted by U.S. pharmaceutical and
agrochemical industries to Chinese regulatory authorities.26
China’s need for trade secrets, proprietary data, and other
confidential information is understandable considering its ongoing and
rapidly growing efforts to boost independent innovation. These efforts
were driven in large part by such government policies as the Outline of
the National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology
Development (2006–2020) and the Outline of the National Intellectual
Property Strategy.27 These outlines were released by the State Council
23 See HANNAS ET AL., supra note 11, at 256–70 (providing the case histories of Chinese
industrial espionage).
24 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], 2014 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 32 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT].
25 Id.
26 For discussions of the protection of clinical trial data, see generally Carlos M. Correa,
Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade
Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES
81 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING HEALTH]; Meir Perez Pugatch,
Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Access, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH, supra, at 97; Jerome H. Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed
Clinical Trial Data: From Private to Public Goods?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra, at 133;
Robert Weissman, Data Protection: Options for Implementation, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH,
supra, at 151; Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs Agreement,
45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443 (2004).
27 See Peter K. Yu, Five Oft-repeated Questions About China’s Recent Rise as a Patent
Power, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 78, 88–96 (discussing these outlines and China’s
independent innovation policies).
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in February 2006 and June 2008, respectively.
B.

Chinese Businesses

The second narrative concerns the interests of Chinese businesses.
Although these businesses do not always appreciate the external
pressure the USTR has exerted on their government, they see the
benefits of legal reforms and improvements in the intellectual property
regime. Like their foreign counterparts, Chinese businesses are deeply
frustrated by the inadequate protection local laws have afforded to trade
secrets, proprietary data, and other confidential information. The lack of
intellectual property protection may also have cost them more than their
foreign counterparts.28
To be fair, China already offers trade secret protection under its
contract, criminal, intellectual property, joint venture, labor, and tort
laws.29 Nevertheless, because the protection comes from many different
statutes and regulations, it is piecemeal at best. Even worse, the Law
Against Unfair Competition—the statute of choice for many rights
holders—is badly outdated. This statute was enacted the year after
China and the United States signed the 1992 Memorandum of
Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property30 and close to a
decade before China joined the WTO.31 Since its enactment in 1993,
this unfair competition law has not been revised, even though
consultations about its revision have already begun.32 The lack of
legislative overhaul in this area stands in sharp contrast to the repeated
amendment of other intellectual property laws. While the Patent and
Trademark Laws have already been amended three times, the Copyright
Law is now undergoing its third wholesale revision.33
28 See Barry Naughton & Yao Yang, The Economic Relationship, in DEBATING CHINA: THE
U.S.–CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS 21, 29 (Nina Hachigian ed., 2014)
(“[W]eak [intellectual property] protection not only hurts American firms but Chinese firms as
well. In fact, it may hurt Chinese firms more.”).
29 See SHAN HAILING, THE PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN CHINA 35–37 (2008); Liu
Xiaohai, Unfair Competition/Trade Secrets/Know-how (2), in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS 127, 136–38 (Rohan Kariyawasam ed., 2011) [hereinafter
CHINESE IP LAWS].
30 Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992,
China–U.S., T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995). Although an earlier memorandum of understanding
covering software protection was signed in 1989, the 1992 memorandum was the “first full
bilateral [intellectual property] agreement” between China and the United States. Joseph A.
Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 235 (2006).
31 China formally became the 143rd WTO member on December 11, 2001. Members and
Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.
htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
32 See Liu, supra note 29, at 160.
33 The Third Amendment to the Patent Law was adopted in December 2008, while the Third
Amendment to the Trademark Law was adopted in August 2013. For a discussion of the
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To local businesses, the external push by the USTR and American
businesses for trade secret reform can therefore be beneficial even if
they dislike foreign criticisms. Such a push would help generate the
momentum needed for legal reform. It would also enable local
businesses to preserve the hard-earned political capital for future
actions. In fact, external pressure has historically played a critical role in
fostering intellectual property reforms in China. Leading examples are
the establishment of the modern intellectual property system in the
1980s and the strengthening of intellectual property rights in the run-up
to China’s WTO accession.34
Notwithstanding the eagerness of local businesses to join their
foreign counterparts in pushing for trade secret reform, it remains
unclear whether the Law Against Unfair Competition will be merely
updated or whether a new trade secret law will be introduced.35 While
an updated statute would certainly provide rights holders—local and
foreign alike—with stronger protection, the latter seems to be what U.S.
businesses prefer. After all, the current unfair competition law was
written from a focus on unfair competition and anti-monopoly
protection.36 The statute does not protect trade secrets as a form of
property the same way U.S. trade secret laws do.37

evolution of the Chinese patent system, see generally Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three
Decades of Development of the Chinese Patent System, 5 WIPO J. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Yu,
Building the Ladder].
34 See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 21, at 185–88 (discussing how the external pressure
exerted by the United States provided the momentum needed for the early intellectual property
reforms in China).
35 See Liu, supra note 29, at 161 (“Scholars and practitioners . . . suggest establishing a
special law for the protection of trade secrets; however, no such official legislative plan exists at
present.”).
36 For discussions of Chinese trade secret laws, see generally SHAN, supra note 29; Hu
Kaizhong, Unfair Competition/Trade Secrets (1), in CHINESE IP LAWS, supra note 29, at 106;
Liu, supra note 29.
37 Compare Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS
Agreement and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act on Which It Is Based, in THE LAW AND THEORY
OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 537, 546–47 (Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) [hereinafter TRADE SECRECY HANDBOOK] (“By
some accounts, the United States insisted [during the TRIPS negotiations] that trade secrets were
a form of property and resisted tying trade secret protection to unfair competition principles.”),
with Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa [Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair
Competition] art. 1 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993,
effective Dec. 1, 1993), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/12/content_1383803.htm (“This Law is formulated with a view to safeguarding the healthy
development of socialist market economy, encouraging and protecting fair competition,
repressing unfair competition acts, and protecting the lawful rights and interests of business
operators and consumers.”); Hu, supra note 36, at 109 (stating that the Law Against Unfair
Competition “attempts to reflect current business practice in commercial markets and the need to
regulate market competition”).
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Chinese Government Officials

The third narrative draws on the positions taken by Chinese
government officials, especially those hardliners who frequently
condemn the external pressure exerted by the USTR and American
businesses. Indeed, past pressures and accusations from the United
States have led to kneejerk protests and oppositions from Chinese
officials. As Chinese Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu declared: “We urge
the US to abandon its Cold War mindset, stop making groundless
accusations against China, and do more to improve mutual trust
between the two nations and friendship between the two peoples.”38
The reactions of these officials are unsurprising, considering that
online hacking and information warfare have been practiced by virtually
all countries capable of such practices,39 the United States included.40 In
their recent book, Cyber War, Richard Clarke, the former National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, and Robert Knake observed:
U.S. intelligence officials do not . . . rate China as the biggest threat
38 Espionage Accusations Against China “Groundless,” CHINA.ORG.CN (May 15, 2009),
http://china.org.cn/international/2009-05/15/content_17780594.htm.
39 As Major Arie Schaap of the U.S. Air Force observed:

As of 2007, there were an estimated 120 countries working on cyber attack commands,
and in 10 to 20 years experts believe we could see countries jostling for cyber
supremacy. States are no doubt preparing to launch international all-out online attacks
and the current political environment includes countries testing the waters to gauge the
potential influence, and risks, of such assaults. The assistant director of the FBI’s cyber
division stated that computer attacks pose the biggest risk “from a national security
perspective, other than a weapon of mass destruction or a bomb on one of our major
cities.” NATO’s Chief of Cyber Defense concurs, stating that “cyber terrorism [and]
cyber attacks pose as great a threat to national security as a missile attack.”
Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law, 64
A.F. L. REV. 121 (2009) (footnotes omitted); see also ROPER, supra note 1, at xiii (“China is not
alone in collecting information for its own economic and military expansion. To some extent,
every country seeks out information on other countries.”); POINDEXTER, supra note 1, at 121–22
(“Real spying . . . is done by almost every government in the world. If the Chinese spy on us, they
do it with clear understanding that we spy on them too. Every country spies on the others as much
as they can support. In all the world’s governments we understand spying and expect it.”).
40 A notable example is the computer worm Stuxnet, which Israel and the United States
jointly designed to infiltrate the computers controlling Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Derek
Bambauer called this worm “the most advanced cyberweapon built to date.” Derek E. Bambauer,
Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2014). As he recounted:
[Stuxnet] performed two clever tasks: it sped up the centrifuges that enrich uranium,
damaging some irreparably, and it concealed the acceleration from the engineers
monitoring the system. Stuxnet recorded data from normal centrifuge operations and,
while sabotaging the centrifuges, replayed the normal data to the engineers, falsely
reassuring them. One piece of sophisticated malware succeeded where diplomacy and
threats of military force failed—it set back Iran’s attempts to craft a nuclear weapon by
at least a year, and likely longer.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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to the U.S. in cyberspace. “The Russians are definitely better, almost
as good as we are,” said one. There seems to be a consensus that
China gets more attention because, intentionally or otherwise, it has
often left a trail of bread crumbs that can be followed back to
Tiananmen Square. . . . Other nations known to have skilled cyber
war units are Israel and France. U.S. intelligence officials have
suggested that there are twenty to thirty militaries with respectable
cyber war capability, including those of Taiwan, Iran, Australia,
South Korea, India, Pakistan, and several NATO states. “The vast
majority of the industrialized countries in the world today have
cyber-attack capabilities,” said former Director of National
Intelligence Admiral Mike McConnell.41

Even more troubling for Chinese officials, the United States’s
accusations often ignore the significant progress China has made in the
intellectual property arena as well as the considerable resources that the
country has poured into intellectual property enforcement in the past
decade. To date, China not only has built a new intellectual property
system from the ground up faster than any other country in history,42 it
also has the world’s largest volume of intellectual property litigation.43
At some point, one has to query whether the scale of piracy and
counterfeiting in China has been so enormous that the expectations of
the USTR and American businesses are somewhat unrealistic.
For many Chinese officials, the United States’s accusations are
also highly disturbing, as they fail to take note of China’s recent reemergence as an innovative power.44 Since 2012, more than two million
patent applications have been filed annually with the State Intellectual
Property Office.45 This two million figure was a target for 2015 in
41
42

CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 10, at 63–64.
See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 33, at 15; see also Jack Valenti, Letter to the
Editor, China’s Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at A26 (“China has accomplished what
no other country has achieved.”).
43 See J. Benjamin Bai & Da Guoping, Strategies for Trade Secrets Protection in China, 9
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 351, 351 (2011) (“China became the world’s most litigious
country for intellectual property disputes in 2005, surpassing the U.S. in the number of
intellectual property lawsuits filed annually.”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know:
Revealing the New China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS L.J. 773, 775 (2011) (“In
2005, there were 12,159 patent, copyright, and trademark cases filed in the United States,
compared to 10,825 cases in China. In 2006, the United States saw 11,486 cases, while China
witnessed 11,436 intellectual property cases. The trend continues, as demonstrated by the fact that
the number of intellectual property cases filed in 2007 for the United States totaled 10,761,
whereas China’s was 15,159.”); Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property
Powers, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 525, 544–49 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Rise and Decline]
(discussing the potential intellectual property litigation explosion in China).
44 For discussions of China’s rise as an innovative power, see generally SHAUN REIN, THE
END OF COPYCAT CHINA: THE RISE OF CREATIVITY, INNOVATION, AND INDIVIDUALISM IN ASIA
(2014); Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 43, at 529–32; Richard P. Suttmeier & Yao Xiangkui,
China’s IP Transition: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights in a Rising China (The National
Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report No. 29, 2011), available at http://chinaus.uoregon.edu/pdf/IP_report.pdf.
45 Comparative Table 1 Contemporary Quantity Comparison of Three Kinds of Patents
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China’s National Patent Development Strategy.46 Although David
Kappos, the then-director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
found the announced target “mind-blowing,”47 that figure was already
surpassed three years ago.
In addition, according to the statistics from the World Intellectual
Property Organization, China had the world’s third largest volume of
applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in 2014, behind
only the United States and Japan.48 Among all the corporate applicants,
Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation had the largest and third
largest number of PCT applications, respectively.49 In the same period,
China also ranked seventh in filing international trademark applications
under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration
of Marks and its related protocol.50 With 20,309 designations, China
was the world’s “most designated member country in international
registrations” within the Madrid System.51
Given the progress China has made in the trademark and patent
areas—and, to some extent, also the copyright area52—one cannot help
but wonder whether the USTR and American businesses are simply
going down the list of intellectual property demands. These demands
started off with copyrights, patents, and trademarks—issues that were
highly contentious in the 1980s and 1990s. Now that these demands
have been largely met, the demandeurs seem to have just moved on to
trade secrets and other areas of intellectual property law.
Although it is logical for demandeurs to go down their list of
demands, this approach is particularly frustrating and demoralizing to
Chinese policymakers, as it suggests the impossibility of satisfying the
USTR and American businesses. In the view of these policymakers,
China will be accused of intellectual property theft regardless of the
progress it has made in the intellectual property field. Even worse, the
demandeurs seem to have a rather narrow focus—a focus that is driven
not by an overall analysis, but by the U.S. competitive advantage. Thus,
from the standpoint of many Chinese policymakers, unless China
focuses its reform on rights that benefit U.S. rights holders, the progress
the country has made in other areas of intellectual property law will be
Received from Home and Domestic Between 2011 and 2012, STATE INTELL. PROP. OFF. P.R.C.
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2012/12/201303/t20130315_788163.html.
46 Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2011, at BU3
(quoting David Kappos, Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
47 Id.
48 Press Release, World Intellectual Property Org., Telecoms Firms Lead WIPO International
Patent Filings, World Intellectual Property Org. Press Release PR/2015/774 (Mar. 19, 2015),
available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2015/article_0004.html.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See Yu, Rise and Decline, supra note 43, at 576–77 (suggesting that the improvements in
the copyright area may not be as dramatic as those in the patent area).
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conveniently ignored.
More damningly for the United States, just as the Obama
administration was heavily criticizing China for hacking into computers
on U.S. soil, news about Edward Snowden and the U.S. government’s
global surveillance program received front-page coverage.53 This
coverage not only caused the United States to lose its moral high
ground, but also provided a vivid reminder that all governments conduct
surveillance and intelligence activities. To a large extent, the news
about Snowden was as ill-timed as Secretary Tommy Thompson’s
reported threat to break Bayer’s patent on ciprofloxacin following the
anthrax attacks in 2001.54 Most policymakers and commentators from
abroad considered his threat hypocritical because around that time the
USTR and the American pharmaceutical industry were aggressively
pressuring South Africa and other developing countries to stop issuing
compulsory licenses to address public health crises, including those
brought about by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.55
Moreover, many U.S. allies, such as France, have actively
practiced industrial espionage. As reported on CBS News, leaked U.S.
diplomatic cables showed that “France [had been] the country that
conduct[ed] the most industrial espionage on other European countries,
even ahead of China and Russia.”56 An editorial from The New York
Times also noted France’s “aggressi[on] in spying to benefit domestic
companies.”57 If the U.S. administration is willing to look the other way
in the case of France, why does it single out China for its complaints?
Did the charges suggest a double standard? Or did they represent yet
53 As a local expert quoted in China Daily declared: “For months, Washington has been
accusing China of cyberespionage, but it turns out the biggest threat to the pursuit of individual
freedom and privacy in the U.S. is the unbridled power of the government.” Joe Nocera, This
Isn’t How to Stop Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2013, at A21.
54 See Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual Property Fight for
Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 257, 280 (2002) (discussing the anthrax attacks
in the United States).
55 See id. (“The U.S. lost significant international legitimacy when the overwhelming
hypocrisy of its own efforts regarding anthrax were juxtaposed against the efforts of developing
countries to secure cheap access to AIDS drugs.”); José Marcos Nogueira Viana, Intellectual
Property Rights, the World Trade Organization and Public Health: The Brazilian Perspective, 17
CONN. J. INT’L L. 311, 313 (2002) (“U.S. and Canadian approaches to the anthrax scare is
precisely what the Brazilian government has been doing over the past two years in response to
HIV/AIDS.”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 727, 777–78 (2011) (noting that “the United States’ short-sighted exploration of compulsory
licensing as an option to lower the price of ciprofloxacin following anthrax attacks in 2001 . . .
suggested a double standard”).
56 Joshua Norman, WikiLeaks: France Leads Russia, China in Industrial Spying in Europe,
CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/wikileaks-france-leadsrussia-china-in-industrial-spying-in-europe.
57 Editorial, America, China and the Hacking Threat, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2014, at SR10;
see also David E. Sanger & Tim Weiner, Emerging Role for the C.I.A.: Economic Spy, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, § 1, at 1 (“France has spied on American companies for years, planting
moles in companies like Boeing and Texas Instruments and breaking into hotel rooms to rifle
through attache cases.”).

142

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

2015

another round of complaints that the administration had to mount to
diffuse domestic political pressure?
D.

TRIPS Commentators

The fourth narrative pertains to the commentary on the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement). Article 39.2 of the Agreement specifically protects
information that “is secret . . . [,] has commercial value . . . and . . . has
been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.”58 Although the
protection offered in this provision is modelled after the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act in the United States,59 the language eventually adopted in
the TRIPS Agreement remains broad and vague.
Equally problematic is Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement,
which mandates protection against the unfair commercial use of clinical
trial data that have been submitted to regulatory agencies for the
approval of pharmaceutical or agrochemical products that have utilized
new chemical entities.60 While the bilateral, regional, and plurilateral
trade agreements that the United States established in the past decade
called for the institution of a data exclusivity regime,61 Article 39.3 does
not introduce such a requirement.
More disappointing to the U.S. pharmaceutical and agrochemical
industries, the TRIPS language includes four additional limitations.
First, Article 39.3 protects pharmaceutical or agrochemical products
that have “utilize[d] new chemical entities.”62 It does not intend to cover
“existing chemical entities that have been reformulated or sold for a
new indication.”63 Second, Article 39.3 protects regulatory data “against
unfair commercial use.”64 With a specific purpose in mind, the
provision does not offer general protection to, or create exclusive rights
58 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39.2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
59 See Sandeen, supra note 37, at 538 (“Subsections (a) through (c) of Article 39(2) are
modeled after the definition of ‘trade secret’ that is contained in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
. . . and are used to define the type and scope of information that must be protected.”).
60 TRIPS Agreement art. 39.3.
61 See, e.g., Central America–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement art. 15.10.1, May
28, 2004, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_
file934_3935.pdf; United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Austl., art. 17.10.1, May
18, 2004, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_
upload_file469_5141.pdf; United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Sing., art.
16.8.1, May 6, 2003, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/
singapore/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf.
62 TRIPS Agreement art. 39.3.
63 Weissman, supra note 26, at 166.
64 TRIPS Agreement art. 39.3.

2015

TRADE SECRET HACKING

143

in, the collected data.65 Third, although Article 39.3 protects these data
against “disclosure,” it does not expressly prohibit regulatory authorities
from making use of or relying on the data, such as when the data are
used in conjunction with the bioequivalence studies submitted by
generic drug manufacturers.66 Finally, Article 39.3 anticipates the need
for disclosure when it is “necessary to protect the public.”67 The
provision therefore includes a built-in exception.
The existence of these many limitations is understandable,
considering that undisclosed information “has never been the subject of
any multilateral agreement before”—an observation aptly made by
Jayashree Watal, a former TRIPS negotiator for India who now works
in the WTO Intellectual Property Division.68 Given the novelty of this
multilateral arrangement, it is no surprise to find compromise language
in Article 39.3. Such language not only reflects the developed countries’
failure to achieve consensus during the TRIPS negotiations,69 but also
foretells the immense and ongoing challenge of developing greater
international protection of trade secrets and proprietary data.

65 See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 50 (2002) (“TRIPS does not require the imposition of data exclusivity, as
such, on these test data, only protection against unfair commercial use.”); Pugatch, supra note 26,
at 129 (“The TRIPS Agreement currently provides the weakest level of data-exclusivity
protection.”); Reichman, supra note 26, at 141–42 (“[T]he meaning of ‘unfair commercial use’
will depend upon the kind of practices that domestic and foreign trade secret laws have
traditionally regarded as unfair.”).
66 See Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in
Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 26, at 27, 30 (“The
TRIPS Agreement provides a limited form of protection for submissions of regulatory data; but
this protection does not prevent a generic producer from making use of publicly available
information to generate bioequivalence test data.”); Reichman, supra note 26, at 144 (“Article
39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent governments from relying upon decisions to allow
the production of relevant products in other jurisdictions, nor does it prevent Members from
authorizing the manufacture of bioequivalent products on the basis of positive regulatory
decisions by local authorities. Legislative history, competition policy and sound principles of
treaty interpretation support this conclusion, as do important decisions in two domestic courts.”);
cf. Pugatch, supra note 26, at 100 (defining non-reliance as the effort “to prevent the authorities
themselves from relying upon the original registration file for a drug when comparing it to the
chemical and toxic levels of a potential generic substitute (so-called bioequivalence tests)”).
67 TRIPS Agreement art. 39.3.
68 JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 4 (2001).
69 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPULSORY LICENSING AND DATA PROTECTION 19
(2001), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/may/tradoc_122031.pdf (“It must
be admitted that the wording of Article 39.3 does not, from a prima facie reading, appear to
impose data exclusivity during a certain period of time. This lack of clarity is the obvious result
of a difficult negotiation process where divergences of views arose between developing and
industrialised countries as to the necessity of EC/US like type of data protection as well as among
industrialised countries on the length of the data exclusivity period.”); see also Sandeen, supra
note 37, at 539–52 (discussing the different phases of the negotiations surrounding Article 39 of
the TRIPS Agreement).
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Human Rights Organizations

The final narrative highlights the concerns of human rights
organizations, which have actively participated in the U.S.–China
debate. Although intellectual property industries have always taken the
position that the intellectual property system has successfully
internalized the protection of human rights,70 human rights
organizations, commentators, and activists beg to differ. For example, in
the Statement on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights
released in August 2000, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights reminded governments of “the primacy
of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements.”71
A year later, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights released a
highly critical report on the many human rights challenges created by
the TRIPS Agreement.72 In a recent article, I also underscored the
tensions, conflicts, and other impediments that bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements have posed to greater protection of human
rights.73
More specifically for our discussion, there is an “uncertain grey
line between state secrets and trade secrets.”74 From a human rights
standpoint, the failure to appreciate the challenge of drawing this line
has serious consequences. Only recently, American policymakers,
businesses, and press expressed concern about the trial (and later
conviction) of Peter Humphrey and his wife, both of whom had been
accused of illegally acquiring private personal information during their
investigation for GlaxoSmithKline.75 A few years ago, the Australian
government, businesses, and press also criticized China’s heavy-handed

70 For the Author’s earlier discussions on the tension between intellectual property and
human rights, see generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Measures and Their
Human Rights Threats, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 455 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human
Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Nonmultilateral
Era]; Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights
Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About
Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709 (2007).
71 Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights Res. 2000/7, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000).
72 U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights: Rep. of the High Comm’r, ¶ 11, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001).
73 See Yu, Nonmultilateral Era, supra note 70, at 1075–91 (discussing these conflicts,
tensions, and impediments).
74 Xiong Ping & Philip Griffith, Protecting Trade Secrets in China: History and Context, 4
QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 30, 55 (2014).
75 See Jane Perlez, China Reveals Charges for British-American Couple in Case Involving
Glaxo, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2014, at B7 (reporting the charges); David Barboza, In China,
British Investigator Hired by Glaxo, and Wife, Are Sent to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2014, at
B3 (reporting the convictions).
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treatment of four Rio Tinto employees, who were initially accused of
espionage and stealing state secrets but were later charged with and
convicted of bribery and trade secret theft.76
Indeed, the foreign criticisms in the state secret area are often
incompatible with those in the trade secret area. More troubling, both
sets of criticisms tend to overlook the historical fact that trade secrets
originated in China as a form of state secret.77 Because state-owned
enterprises, and by extension the state, were often involved in the early
days of trade secret protection in China, the roots of such protection
diverged significantly from those found in Australia or the United
States.
To be certain, one could still debate about whether the Chinese
state secret law is vague and arbitrary or whether it has been unfairly
applied to foreign nationals, such as the Humphreys or the four Rio
Tinto employees.78 It is also important to question whether the line
between business secrets and state secrets has been properly drawn in
China, given the very different nature of the secret information
involved. Regardless of one’s position in these debates, however, it is
not difficult to notice the unconvincing and self-serving positions taken
by foreign governments, businesses, and media. To many foreign
critics, whether the protection of secret information in China should be
strengthened or weakened depends largely on whether the law protects
their own interests.
II.

FIVE MODEST SUGGESTIONS

Given the highly sensitive and polarized nature of the U.S.–China
debate and the depth of the problem concerning online hacking, data
breaches, and trade secret protection, this Article does not attempt to
76 See David Barboza, Chinese Court Hands Down Stiff Sentences to Four Mining Company
Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A4 (“The four [Rio Tinto employees] were arrested
last July on suspicions of espionage and stealing state secrets from Chinese state-owned steel
companies. But after protests from Australian officials and foreign executives about the
seriousness of the espionage accusations, the men were formally charged with bribery and
stealing commercial secrets, which are lesser charges.”).
77 See SHAN, supra note 29, at 4 (stating that, prior to China’s re-opening in the late 1970s,
“trade secrets were confined to being classified only as one important type of State secret and by
that measure alone they acquired the status of State secrets and were protected by state
administrative measures” (footnote omitted)). Even today, “[s]tate secrets can . . . include trade
secrets that concern state security and state interests that have been determined by special legal
procedures and that have been acknowledged by certain persons at a particular time.” Id. at 138.
78 See David Barboza, China Says Australian Is Detained in Spy Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2009, at A10 (“Legal scholars noted that China’s state secrets law was vague and is often used to
punish political opponents or those Beijing considered a threat to national interests. . . . ‘The
reason it’s up for revision is there’s widespread dissatisfaction with it,’ said Jerome Cohen, a
professor of law at New York University and a specialist in China’s legal system. ‘It lends itself
to arbitrary treatment. Police can take advantage of stretching the law.’”).
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identify the needed legal and policy reforms. Instead, this Part outlines
five modest suggestions on how a more constructive debate can be
developed to narrow the differences between China and the United
States. In doing so, it seeks to identify ways to reduce online hacking
and data breaches as well as to enhance the protection of trade secrets
and proprietary data.
First, as far as the debate on China’s effort to steal trade secrets
and proprietary data is concerned, it is important to be more specific
about the type of secret involved. Does the debate concern state secrets,
political secrets, military secrets, personal secrets, scientific or
technological secrets, or business, industrial, or trade secrets?
Obviously, the U.S. government and businesses care about the
theft of more than one type of secret. In fact, they may care about the
protection of all types of secrets. Nevertheless, different types of secrets
implicate disparate laws and policies. Not only may the justifications for
these laws and policies differ, their strengths and weaknesses may also
vary. In addition, distinctive exceptions, limitations, and safeguards
may have been built into the implicated laws and policies.
Thus, the more we can pinpoint the type of secret involved, the
easier it will be to improve our understanding of the complicated issues,
and the more likely we will be able to develop a well-reasoned debate.
A more specific focus and a more concrete discussion will also help
policymakers, commentators, and businesses to locate the solutions
needed to address the ongoing challenge.
The second suggestion concerns the need to update the
international standards for protecting trade secrets and other undisclosed
information. The TRIPS Agreement—Article 39, in particular—was
drafted based on standards available in the late 1980s and the early
1990s. As Daniel Gervais, who was working at the GATT/WTO
Secretariat at the time of the TRIPS negotiations, observed, “TRIPS
adjusted the level of intellectual property protection to what was the
highest common denominator among major industrialized countries as
of 1991.”79 It is therefore no surprise that many Chinese and U.S.
businesses have found the TRIPS standards for the protection of trade
secrets and undisclosed information inadequate.
Nevertheless, until the international community, or at least China
and the United States,80 can agree on new international minimum
79 Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on
Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES
AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
80 Compare C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 25
(2008) (noting the need for China and the United States to “develop a very informal but
increasingly effective ‘G-2’ . . . to help guide the global governance process on an increasing
number of economic topics”), with STEFAN A. HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S
AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 216–18 (2010)
(arguing against the elevation of the U.S.–China relations to the bilateral status of a special G-2
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standards, it is unlikely that the dispute between China and the United
States can be easily resolved. Although amending the TRIPS
Agreement provides the most obvious path to revise these standards, the
standards can also be modified through the negotiation of new bilateral,
regional, and plurilateral agreements, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.
Because China has thus far been excluded from the negotiation of these
agreements,81 it remains to be seen what other opportunities exist for
these two countries to reach an agreement on the new standards for
trade secrets and proprietary data.
The third suggestion regards the need for the U.S. government and
American businesses to identify the specific deficiencies in current
Chinese law, as opposed to making only vague criticisms. For
illustrative purposes, consider the USTR’s discussion of the Law
Against Unfair Competition in his 2014 Section 301 Report:
Under Chinese law . . . available remedies are difficult to obtain,
given that civil, administrative, and criminal enforcement against
trade secrets theft remains severely constrained. Enforcement
obstacles include various deficiencies in China’s AUCL [Law
Against Unfair Competition]; constraints on gathering evidence for
use in litigation; difficulties in meeting the criteria for establishing
that information constitutes a trade secret; and criminal penalties that
do not provide adequate deterrents. Unlike other Chinese
[intellectual property] laws, the AUCL does not expressly authorize
judges to issue certain provisional orders that are often critical to the
successful pursuit of a civil enforcement action. While China’s new
Civil Procedure Law may address, or partially address, that problem,
there has been insufficient time to ascertain whether this new law is
facilitating access to civil remedies in practice. Additionally, the
AUCL appears to apply primarily to “commercial undertakings” and
not to impose liability on individual actors; the AUCL also requires
that a trade secret have “practical applicability,” which may limit the
scope of protection for early stage research.82

While the last sentence in this excerpt provides concrete
suggestions for trade secret reform in China, the second sentence does
not. The USTR is right to point out the many enforcement obstacles in
China. However, the discussion of these obstacles has existed for more
than two decades.83 If they cannot be removed in the copyright, patent,
and trademark areas, why would the situation be any different for trade
relationship).
81 See Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1129, 1132–
51 (2014) (discussing China’s experience as a “TPP outsider”).
82 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 24, at 32.
83 See Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, China–U.S., 34
I.L.M. 881 (providing in the annex an “Action Plan for Effective Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights”).

148

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

2015

secrets?84 Moreover, enforcement obstacles implicate areas that are both
relevant and irrelevant to intellectual property protection. For similar
reasons, “constraints on gathering evidence”85 pose challenges to all
forms of litigation. Even if Chinese intellectual property policymakers
are sympathetic to the concerns of the USTR and American businesses,
it is unclear how easy it would be for these policymakers to address
issues that go beyond their mandate and field of expertise.
The fourth suggestion relates to our need to develop a holistic and
more contextualized debate on the protection of trade secrets and
proprietary data—perhaps by taking into account the economic, social,
and cultural aspects of such protection. As much as laws and policies
are needed to improve the protection of undisclosed proprietary
information, we also need to think more about whether those laws and
policies would respond to the divergent local business, employment,
and cultural conditions. In a recent book, Catherine Fisk wrote: “As
workplace knowledge became corporate intellectual property, the
combination of new legal and business practices transformed not only
work relations but also class relations for creative people.”86 In her
view, the protection of trade secrets, proprietary data, and workplace
knowledge concern not only rights holders, but also other people
involved.
In a very crowded environment such as China, it is not always easy
to protect trade secrets and other confidential information, not to
mention that many Chinese are still accustomed to using inside
knowledge to show connections, earn respect, enhance stature, or
indicate actual power or influence.87 The protection of trade secrets also
goes hand in hand with the reasonable measures taken to maintain
secrecy. Article 39.2 of the TRIPS Agreement specifically mentions the
“reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in
control of the information, to keep it secret.”88 In many jurisdictions,
courts determine the grant of trade secret protection based on whether
the right holders have taken reasonable security measures.89 Given the
requirement of having these measures and the inevitable variations over
84 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets Protection in China, 47
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1007, 1011 (2014) (“[T]rade secrets are notoriously difficult to enforce
in China and present obstacles that are in some important respects even greater than hurdles in the
enforcement of other intellectual property rights, such as trademarks.”).
85 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 24, at 32.
86 CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF
CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800–1930, at 245 (2009).
87 Cf. HAROLD CHEE WITH CHRIS WEST, MYTHS ABOUT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 65–74
(2d ed. 2007) (discussing the myth and reality about the use of “guanxi,” or connections, in
China).
88 TRIPS Agreement art. 39.2(c).
89 For a discussion of the need for these measures, see generally Robert G. Bone, Trade
Secrecy, Innovation and the Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy Precautions, in TRADE
SECRECY HANDBOOK, supra note 37, at 46.
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what measures would be deemed reasonable in the circumstances,90 it is
logical to question whether the trade secrets protected in one country
would automatically be protected in another.
The final suggestion pertains to our need to develop a deeper and
more sophisticated understanding of information flow. This flow
involves not only trade secrets and proprietary data, but also all other
types of information. Developing such an understanding is important,
because the flow of information, like water or heat, is often hard to
control. As Hans von Baeyer put eloquently:
As humans, we not only acquire information through our senses, we
also feel compelled to share it with each other. From the first cries of
emerging humans that we hear echoed from a baby’s crib, from the
gossip of cave-dwellers around the communal fire to our satellitetransmitted e-mail messages, the appetite for information has been as
integral to the human condition as the hunger for food and love.91

Thus, instead of focusing on preventing the flow of information—
through legal protection or otherwise—it is increasingly important to
reframe the debate as one about risk management and damage
mitigation.92
While some would certainly fear that the information flowing to
China could harm the United States—by, perhaps, undermining the
latter’s competitive advantage—the same flow of information could
also create opportunities while promoting collaboration between
Chinese and U.S. businesses. After all, businesses are unlikely to work
with each other if they do not understand what others are doing or if
their approaches are vastly different.
At the macro level, an active flow and exchange of information is
also important because it can help improve or stabilize the oft-turbulent
U.S.–China relationship. As Zhou Enlai, the former Chinese premier,
once told Henry Kissinger, “When you have become familiar with
[China], it will not be as mysterious as before.”93 Richard Clarke and
Robert Knake concurred: “Knowing what another nation’s capabilities
are and having a view into what they are doing behind closed doors

90 See Sandeen, supra note 37, at 557 (“In practice, what is reasonable depends upon an
analysis that is partly based upon the facts and partly upon the court’s perception of fairness. In
effect, the reasonable efforts requirement encompasses the ‘general principles’ approach initially
proposed by the EC because it allows WTO member countries latitude to determine what is
reasonable in light of their own definitions of honest and dishonest commercial practices.”).
91 HANS CHRISTIAN VON BAEYER, INFORMATION: THE NEW LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE 9
(2003).
92 See Bambauer, supra note 40, at 1019 (“[F]ocusing efforts principally on preventing
cyberattacks is misguided: perfect security is impossible, and even attaining good security is
extraordinarily difficult. Instead, cybersecurity regulation should concentrate on mitigating the
damage that successful attacks cause.”).
93 RICHARD H. SOLOMON, CHINESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: PURSUING INTERESTS
THROUGH “OLD FRIENDS” 15 (1999).
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usually contributes to stability.”94
In sum, the flow of information does not always harm a country; it
depends on the type of information involved. To avoid throwing away
the baby with the bath water, we need to develop a deeper and more
sophisticated understanding that separates the good flow of information
from its bad flow. In doing so, we will be able to focus more on risk and
damage than on protection per se. While some information should be
protected, other should be allowed to flow freely.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown how the parties in the current U.S.–China
debate on online hacking and trade secret protection continue to talk
past each other. To help identify reform options that benefit both sides,
the Article offers five modest suggestions on how a more positive
debate can be constructed. Although these suggestions will in no way
resolve the ongoing dispute between China and the United States, it is
my hope that they will provide an important step toward strengthening
the protection of trade secrets and proprietary data in China.
Policymakers, commentators, and the media remain fascinated by
the potential conflict between Chinese culture and intellectual property
reforms—a proposition other commentators and I have repeatedly
questioned.95 Trade secrets, however, is not an area in which such a
conflict has arisen. In this area, China and the United States actually
share some common and historical interests.
In China, the efforts to protect workplace knowledge and technical
information date back to centuries ago. During the Qing Dynasty, for
example, “the producers of the celebrated Tongren Temple line of
medicines . . . sought to maintain the confidentiality of their
manufacturing process by employing only family members or eunuchs,
or by keeping vital parts of the process secret from nonfamily
employees.”96 Given this longstanding tradition and the common
interests between China and the United States, it is indeed lamentable
that these two countries have thus far failed to work more closely
together to strengthen the protection of trade secrets and proprietary
data. Such strengthened protection would benefit not only American
businesses but also Chinese industries.
94
95

CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 10, at 230.
For the Author’s recent discussions on Confucianism and intellectual property reforms, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Confucianism, in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 247 (Irene Calboli & Srividhya
Ragavan eds., 2015); Peter K. Yu, The Confucian Challenge to Intellectual Property Reforms, 4
WIPO J. 1 (2012).
96 WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 16 (1995).

